Ricoh Mp C3001 Instruction Manual

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Table 32 : Relationship between Security Objectives and Functional Requirements 
 
O.DOC.NO_DIS O.DOC.NO_ALT O.FUNC.NO_ALT O.PROT.NO_ALT O.CONF.NO_DIS O.CONF.NO_ALT O.USER.AUTHORIZED O.INTERFACE.MANAGED O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED O.AUDIT.LOGGED O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT 
FAU_GEN.1          X   
FAU_GEN.2          X   
FAU_STG.1          X   
FAU_STG.4          X   
FAU_SAR.1          X   
FAU_SAR.2          X...

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O.DOC.NO_DIS O.DOC.NO_ALT O.FUNC.NO_ALT O.PROT.NO_ALT O.CONF.NO_DIS O.CONF.NO_ALT O.USER.AUTHORIZED O.INTERFACE.MANAGED O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED O.AUDIT.LOGGED O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT 
FMT_MSA.3(b)       X      
FMT_MTD.1    X X X     X  
FMT_SMF.1    X X X     X  
FMT_SMR.1    X X X     X  
FPT_STM.1          X   
FPT_TST.1         X    
FTA_SSL.3       X X     
FTP_ITC.1 X X X X X X            X 
 
6.3.2...

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Copyright (c) 2011 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved. 
is thus restricted to perform each operation. 
FMT_MSA.3(a) surely sets the restrictive value to the security attributes of document data (object) 
when document data are generated. 
By satisfying FDP_ACC.1(a), FDP_ACF.1(a), FDP_RIP.1, FTP_ITC.1, FMT_MSA.1(a) and 
FMT_MSA.3(a), which are the security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.DOC.NO_DIS 
is fulfilled. 
O.DOC.NO_ALT Protection of document alteration...

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(3)  Management of the security attributes. 
FMT_MSA.1(a) restricts each available operation (newly create, query, modify and delete) for the login 
user name to specified users only. 
FMT_MSA.3(a) sets the restrictive value to the security attributes of user jobs (object) when the user 
jobs are generated. 
By satisfying FDP_ACC.1(a), FDP_ACF.1(a), FTP_ITC.1, FMT_MSA.1(a) and FMT_MSA.3(a), which are 
the security functional...

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O.CONF.NO_ALT Protection of TSF confidential data alteration 
O.CONF.NO_ALT is the security objective to allow only users who can maintain the security to alter the 
TSF confidential data. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following 
countermeasures. 
(1)  Management of the TSF confidential data. 
FMT_MTD.1 allows the MFP administrator and applicable normal user to operate the login password...

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(3)  Complicate decoding of login password. 
FIA_UAU.7 displays dummy letters as authentication feedback on the Operation Panel and prevents the 
login password from disclosure. 
FIA_SOS.1 accepts only passwords that satisfy the minimum character number and password character 
combination specified for the Basic Authentication by the MFP administrator, and makes it difficult to 
guess the password. For the External...

    Page 76 of 93 
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(3)  Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces. 
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 prevents the data received from the Operation Panel, LAN interface and telephone 
line from being transmitted from the LAN or telephone line without further processing by the TSF. 
By satisfying FIA_UID.1(a), FIA_UID.1(b), FIA_UAU.1(a), FIA_UAU.1(b), FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.2, 
FTA_SSL.3 and FPT_FDI_EXP.1, which are the security functional requirements for...

    Page 77 of 93 
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(1)  Generate appropriate cryptographic keys. 
FCS_CKM.1 generates the cryptographic key for encryption. 
(2)  Perform cryptographic operation. 
FCS_COP.1 encrypts the data to be stored in the HDD, and decrypts the data to be read from the HDD. 
(3)  Manage the TSF data. 
FMT_MTD.1 allows the MFP administrator to manage the cryptographic keys. 
(4)  Specification of Management Function. 
FMT_SMF.1 performs the required...

    Page 78 of 93 
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FCS_CKM.4 
FCS_COP.1 [FDP_ITC.1 or  
FDP_ITC.2 or   
FCS_CKM.1] 
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4 
FDP_ACC.1(a) FDP_ACF.1(a) FDP_ACF.1(a) None 
FDP_ACC.1(b) FDP_ACF.1(b) FDP_ACF.1(b) None 
FDP_ACF.1(a) FDP_ACC.1(a) 
FMT_MSA.3(a) FDP_ACC.1(a) 
FMT_MSA.3(a) None 
FDP_ACF.1(b) FDP_ACC.1(b) 
FMT_MSA.3(b) FDP_ACC.1(b) 
FMT_MSA.3(b) None  
FDP_RIP.1 None  None  None 
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1(a) FIA_UAU.1(a) None 
FIA_ATD.1 None  None  None...

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FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 None 
FPT_STM.1 None  None  None 
FPT_TST.1 None  None  None 
FTA_SSL.3 None  None  None 
FTP_ITC.1 None  None  None 
 
The following explains the rationale for acceptability in all cases where a dependency is not satisfied:   
 
Rationale for Removing Dependencies on FCS_CKM.4 
Once the MFP administrator generates the cryptographic key that is used for the HDD encryption of this 
TOE at the...