Ricoh Mp 3351 User Guide

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Copyright (c) 2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved.  A.NETWORK    (Assumptions for network connections) 
As specified by A.NETWORK, when the network that the TOE is connected to (the internal network) is 
connected to an external network such as the Internet, the internal network shall be protected from 
unauthorised communications originating from the external network. 
As specified by OE.NETWORK, if the internal network, to which the TOE is connected, is connected to an...

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Copyright (c) 2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved.  T.TRANSIT    (Data interception and tampering with communication path) 
To counter this threat, the TOE protects document data and Print Data on communication path from leakage, 
and detects tampering. In addition, the performance of O.NET.PROTECT is recorded as audit logs by 
O.AUDIT, and the function to read audit logs is only provided to the machine administrator so that the 
machine administrator verifies afterwards whether...

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Copyright (c) 2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved.  5 Extended Components Definition 
In this ST and TOE, there are no extended components, i.e., the new security requirements and security 
assurance requirements that are not described in the CC, which is claimed the conformance in 2.1 CC 
conformance Claim.  

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Copyright (c) 2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved.  6 Security Requirements 
This section describes the security functional requirements, security assurance requirements, and security 
requirements rationale. 
6.1 Security Functional Requirements 
This section describes the TOE security functional requirements for fulfilling the security objectives defined 
in 4.1 Security Objectives for TOE. The security functional requirements are quoted from the requirement 
defined in the CC...

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Copyright (c) 2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved. Functional requirements Actions which should be auditable Auditable events of TOE information (e.g. secret or private 
keys). Success/Failure) FCS_COP.1 a) Minimal: Success/failure, and type 
of cryptographic operation. 
b) Basic: Any applicable cryptographic 
mode(s) of operation, subject and 
object attributes.  
1. Storage of document data successful 2. Reading of  document data 
successful FDP_ACC.1 None - FDP_ACF.1 a)...

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Copyright (c) 2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved. Functional requirements Actions which should be auditable Auditable events of TOE 3. Changing administrator 
authentication information (Outcome: 
Success/Failure) 
4. Changing supervisor authentication 
information (Outcome: 
Success/Failure) FIA_UAU.2 Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the 
authentication mechanism; 
Basic: All use of the authentication 
mechanism. Basic 
1. Login (Outcome: Success/Failure) FIA_UAU.7 None -...

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Copyright (c) 2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved. Functional requirements Actions which should be auditable Auditable events of TOE 6. Changing time and date of system 
clock. 
7. Deleting entire audit logs. FMT_SMF.1 a) Minimal: Use of the Management 
Functions.  
1. Adding and deleting administrator 
roles. 
2. Lockout release by the unlocking 
administrator. 
3. Changing time and date of system 
clock. FMT_SMR.1 a) Minimal: modifications to the group 
of users that are part...

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Copyright (c) 2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved.  b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional 
components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: communication IP address, IDs of 
persons whose authentication information is created/changed/deleted, Locking out users, 
release of user Lockout, method of Lockout release, IDs of object document data]. 
 
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review 
Hierarchical to: No other components. 
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1...

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Copyright (c) 2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved.  FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] 
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction. 
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key 
generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm shown in 
Table 5] and specified cryptographic key size [assignment: cryptographic key size shown 
in Table 5] that meet the following: [assignment: standards shown in Table...

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Copyright (c) 2010 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All Rights Reserved.  Table 7: List of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects Subjects Objects Operations among subjects and objects Administrator process Document data Deleting document data General user process Document data Storing document data 
Reading document data 
Deleting document data  
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control 
Hierarchical to: No other components. 
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access...